Footnotes
1. Newell, Richard S; The Politics of Afghanistan; Cornell University Press 1972
2. British Library India Office papers; Dane, Sir Louis William; D 659 1-11
3. British Library India Office papers; Roos-Keppel, Lt Col Sir George; Mss Eur D613
4. Churchill, Winston S; The Story of the Malakand Field Force; Longmans 1898
5. Fraser-Tytler, Sir William; Afghanistan; OUP 1950
6. Fraser-Tytler; op cit
7. British Library India Office papers; Roos-Keppel, Lt Col Sir George; Mss Eur D613
8. Translated for the author in 2006 by Najibullah Razaq
9. Poullada, LB; Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1929; Cornell University Press 1973
10. Poullada; op cit
11. Poullada; op cit
12. DeNeufville, Peter B; Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Genesis of the nationalist anti-communist movement 1969-1979; King's College thesis 2006
13. De Neufville; op cit
14. Newell; op cit
15. Author interview with Nancy Hatch Dupree
16. Author interview with Nancy Hatch Dupree
17. Sweetser, Anne; Afghanistan Council occasional paper no 9; The Asia Society. 1976
18. Sweetser; op cit
19. Newell, Richard S; op cit
20. Poullada LB; Afghanistan in the 1970s. ed Louis Dupree; Praeger NY 1970
21. Magnus, Ralph; Afghanistan in the 1970s. ed Louis Dupree; Praeger NY 1970
22. Magnus; op cit
23. Magnus; op cit
24. Edwards, David; Before Taliban – genealogies of the Afghan Jihad; Univ of Calif press 1996
25. Ahmad, Ishtiaq; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; Pangraphics Pvt
26. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan; Princeton University Press 1980
27. Antonio Giustozzi, who has spent years working on Afghanistan and its recent history, suggests a figure of 600,000 for civilian casualties, while others assert that the number is far higher, perhaps 1.5 million. General Lyakhovski, a Soviet officer who wrote on the war, believed the numbers killed to be 2.5 million, but he offered no source for his estimates. A. Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana (Moscow 2009), p. 1018; see Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy (London: Profile, 2010).
28. Lester Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1998), p. 135.
29. William Maley, The Wars in Afghanistan (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 71.
30. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, Why the Weak Win Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 182; see also the article, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 93–128.
31. Robert M. Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA., Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), p.20.
32. L. Sherbarshin, ‘Ruka Moskvy: zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi razvedki’ (http://sherarshin.ru/lest.html) See Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy (London: Profile, 2010).
33. Braithwaite, Afgantsy, p. 250.
34. Toft, Why the Weak, p. 194.
35. Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan, p. 26.
36. Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan, p. 57.
37. Edward Giradet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
38. Astri Suhrke, “Reconstruction as Modernisation: The ‘Post-Conflict’ Project in Afghanistan”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 7 (2007), p. 1301.
39. Astrid Suhrke, ‘‘The dangers of a tight embrace: externally assisted statebuilding in Afghanistan” in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding (2009), p.233.
40. G. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 227-8.
41. See Rob Johnson, A Region in Turmoil (London: Reaktion, 2005).
42. See, for example, Rob Johnson, ‘Managing Helmand from Bost to Bastion’, International Area Studies Review, (Forthcoming 2012).
43. Maley, Wars in Afghanistan, p. 230.
44. M.J. Gohari, The Taliban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 108-110.
45. “Taliban to mark Afghan Hindus”, CNNfyi.com, 22 May 2001. Accessed August 2012.
46. UNSCR 1333, 19 December 2000, reinforced by SCR 1363 allowed for measures of counter-terrorism. The Taliban vowed to kill any United Nations officials it found in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. A. Rashid, The Taliban (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 2000), p. xi.
47. President Obama, The Financial Times, 19 November 2009.
48. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “US military dismayed by delays in three key development projects in Afghanistan”, Washington Post, 28 April 2011.
49. Interviews, Oxford, names purposely omitted, March 2012.
50. US Army officers have been particularly vocal in expressing their concerns about the performance of the US Air Force regarding such matters as erroneous bombing missions and insufficient priority to the provision of surveillance aircraft. See Thom Shanker, ‘‘At Odds with Air Force, Army Adds its own Aviation Unit”, New York Times, 22 June 2008.
51. Human Rights Watch, “Troops in Contact”: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2008), p. 2. Available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2008/afghanistan0908/index.htm
52. President Hamid Karzai, interview published in New York Times, 26 April 2008.
53. E.g. Peter Beaumont, “Afghanistan: Fear, disillusion and despair: notes from a divided land as peace slips away”, The Observer, London, 8 June 2008, pp. 34–5.
54. “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General”, UN doc. S/2008/617 of 23 September 2008, para. 2.
55. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), pp. 107-108.
56. Information from three UNHCR sources: 2006 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (Geneva: UNHCR, December 2007), p. 36; 2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2008), pp. 8 and 9; and the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database at www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase.
57. Lydia Poole, ”Afghanistan: Tracking major resource flows 2002-2010”, Briefing Paper, Global Humanitarian Assistance (2011).
58. Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 325.
59. Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace (London: Zed Books, 2008), p.130.
60. Johnson and Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, p. 132.
61. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 321.
62. Johnson and Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, p.136.
63. A ‘Man’ is a traditional unit of measure in Afghanistan. One Kandahari Man is the equivalent of 4.5 kilos. There are four Charak to one Man. PRs refers to Pakistani rupees.
64. Prices in southern Afghanistan are typically cited in Pakistan Rupees. In May 2010 US$1 was the equivalent of PRs 84.
65. Ibid.
66. David Mansfield, Helmand Counter Narcotics Impact Study (May 2010), p.10.
67. David Mansfield, Helmand Counter Narcotics Impact Study (May 2010), p.10.
68. David Mansfield, Helmand Counter Narcotics Impact Study (May 2010), p.10.
69. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007), p. 86.
70. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, p. 86.
71. Jon W. Anderson, Doing Pakhtu: Social Organization of the Ghilzai Pashtun (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1979), p. 23.
72. Anderson, Doing Pakhtu, p. 24
73. Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “The Taliban in their own words”, Newsweek, 26 September 2009.
74. Mansfield, Helmand Counter Narcotics Impact Study (May 2010), p. 17.
75. BAAG Report, Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds (2009).
76. Christopher Cramer, “Trajectories of accumulation through war and peace”, in, Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 129.
77. Peter Marsden, Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empires (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009).
78. ‘U.S. Offers $200,000 to catch “Most Wanted” Taliban’, Associated Press, 1 October 2007; Alisa Tang, “Attacks down sharply in E. Afghanistan” Associated Press, 24 February 2008; Graham Turbiville, ‘‘Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations: Selected Perspectives and Experience”, Joint Special Operations University, Report 07-6, (June 2007), pp.52-73; Peter Cullen, ‘‘The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign against Terror”, Joint Force Quarterly, 48, (2008).
79. Second Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry’s testimony was given at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 13 February 2007.
80. Anthony Cordesman, “Lets Get Serious”, The Times, 10 August 2009.
81. My sources for this include American, German and Afghan officials involved in the peace talks process as well as officials in Kabul briefed on the talks.
82. Emir ul Momineen Mullah Mohammad Omar, Eid message to the people of Afghanistan, press release by the Taliban, 15 November 2010.
83. Hillary Clinton, Asia Society, The Richard Holbrooke Memorial Address, New York, 18 February 2011.
84. The major leaks were in the Washington Post and Der Spiegel. Karen De Young, “US speeds up direct talks with Taliban”, Washington Post, 17 May 2011. Also Susanne Koelbl and Holger Stark, “Germany mediates secret US-Taliban Talks”, Spiegel OnLine, 24 May 2011.
85. Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office, ‘In MIT visit, Miliband presses for Afghan peace deal,’ Massachusetts, 11 March 2010.
86. Off-the-record conversations with US Government officials and former officials, 2009–2013.
87. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Increased Visibility, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan” (September 2009). The use of CERP funds to support private businesses is explicitly prohibited, with a few exceptions (e.g., battle damage payments). DOD Financial Management Regulation, “Summary of Major Changes to DOD 7000.14-r”, Volume 12, Chapter 27 “Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)” (January 2009), pp. 27–8, available at comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/12/12_27.pdf.
88. For an official management critique of CERP in Afghanistan, see Inspector General of the US Department of Defense, “Management Improvements Needed in the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan” (November 2011), available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy12/DODIG–2012–023.pdf. For external sceptical appraisals of how well CERP development investments contribute to COIN objectives, see Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love” (1 December 2009), at ForeignPolicy.com; Edwina Thompson, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations,” Report on Wilton House Conference No. 1022 (Whilton Park, April 2010). For evaluations of USAID programmes, see USAID Inspector General’s audits of Afghanistan programmes available at www.usaid.gov/oig/public/reports/afghanistan_ information_audit_and_specialrptsmemos.html.
89. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” (April 2010), p. 69.
90. Alissa J. Rubin, “Afghan Commander Issues Rules on Contractors,” New York Times (September 13, 2010); COMISAF memorandum, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance”, 8 September 2010, available at http://www.isaf.nato. int/images/stories/File/100908-NUI-COMISAF%20COIN%20GUIDANCE.pdf.
91. For an overview of major sources on the Afghan economy, see the “Private Sector Development in Afghanistan: The Doubly Missing Middle” in Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price (eds), American Interests in South Asia: Building a Grand Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (Aspen Institute, 2011), pp. 123–4, n. 6. The publications of the World Bank and IMF provide the most up-to-date data and analyses of recent Afghan economic developments. See, for instance, The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update (Washington: World Bank, April 2013), and The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 (Washington: World Bank, May 2012). Above all, however, our experiences meeting Afghan businessmen – whether walking a shop floor in Herat or discussing electricity prices in Jalalabad – inform our perspective.
92. Afghanistan ranks 168 of 183 countries in GDP (nominal) per capita income at $543/year in 2011 (World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, available at http://databank.worldbank.org). Its rank on most other indicators of economic and social development is shockingly poor. For instance, Afghanistan ranks the worst in Asia in infant and child mortality, maternal mortality, gender equity in education, literacy, primary education completion, life expectancy at birth, death rate, and slum population as a percent of urban population. See Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2012 (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2012).
93. For his discussion of the four principal “traps” to development, see Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
94. Paul Collier, “In Afghanistan, the Threat of Plunder,” New York Times (20 July 2010). † GDP (nominal) data from World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.
95. GDP (nominal) data from World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.
96. Estimate based upon data contained in Fry, The Afghan Economy. § Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 71.
97. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 71.
98. GDP (nominal) data from World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.
99. By the mid 1970s, regional price differences decrteased significantly as the new road networks facilitated for the first time the establishment of a true national market. Nyrop and Seekins, Afghanistan, p. 167.
100. The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, p. 17. On overall post-conflict trends, see UNDP, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity (New York: UNDP, 2008).
101. GDP growth (annual %) for 2009 and 2010 from World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.
102. Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2012 (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2012), Table 4.8.
103. See trade, vehicles, and industrial production data in IMF, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Statistical Appendix,” February 2008, and Central Statistics Office available at www.cso.gov.af. The growth in private sector industrial production plateaued, however, in many categories of goods after 2009. See “Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, 2011–2012: Industries Development”, available at http://cso.gov.af/Content/ files/Industries%20Development.pdf.
104. Brookings Institution, Afghanistan Index (13 June 2013), Figure 3.6.
105. The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, p. 5.
106. The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, pp. 21–44; The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update.
107. The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 1, p. 1. ‡ Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 29–30.
108. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 29-30.
109. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 9.
110. US Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues (February 2013), p. 21.
111. “Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan” (21 May 2012), available at http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.
112. On this theme of “economic sovereignty”, see “Special Defense Department Briefing by Paul Brinkley, Director, DOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan; Jack Medlin, Regional Specialist, US Geological Survey International Programs; Kathleen Johnson, Mineral Program Coordinator, USGS” (June 14, 2010) available at www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4643. See also Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, “Afghan Economic Sovereignty: Establishing a Viable Nation” (Briefing released June 2010) available at www.defense.gov/news/d2010614slides.pdf.
113. The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, p. 26.
114. Alisa Rubin and Mujib Mashal, “Afghanistan Moves Quickly to Tap Newfound Mineral Reserves,” New York Times (17 June 2010). †† “Afghanistan minerals fully mapped,” BBC News (18 July 2012).
115. “Afghanistan Minerals fully mapped” (BBC New, 18th July 2013)
116. “Indian consortium wins $10bn Afghanistan mines deal,” BBC News (29 November 2011).
117. For background, see the National and Regional Resource Corridors Program’s website at http://www.nrrcp.gov.af.
118. On addressing the “resource curse” challenge, see Collier, The “Bottom Billion,” pp. 38–53; Collier, “In Afghanistan, the Threat of Plunder”; Amela Karabegović, “Institutions, Economic Growth, and the ‘Curse’ of Natural Resources”, Fraser Institute Studies in Mining (July 2009); Center for Global Development, “Fighting the Resource Curse Through Cash Transfers” at www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/ revenues_distribution; and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which Afghanistan has recently joined, at www.eiti.org.
119. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People (Washington: Asia Foundation, 2012), pp. 86, 107–11.
120. The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, p. 15.
121. See Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, “Afghan Economic Sovereignty: Establishing a Viable Nation”.
122. On the New Silk Road initiative, see S. Frederick Starr and Andrew C. Kuchins, “The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program (May 2010); Robert D. Hormats, “The United States’ ‘New Silk Road’ Strategy: What is it? Where is it Headed?” Remarks to the SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and CSIS Forum (29 September 2011) available at http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2011/174800.htm; Andrew C. Kuchins, “A Truly Regional Economic Strategy for Afghanistan,” Washington Quarterly (Spring 2011), pp. 77–91; Robert O. Blake, Jr., “The New Silk Road and Regional Economic Integration”, Remarks to the Turkic American Convention (13 March 2013) available at http://www. state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2013/206167.htm. See also the information on the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, which is a multilateral partnership to promote regional economic development in Central Asia, at www.adb.org/CAREC.
123. When asked: “What is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole?” 28 percent chose insecurity/violence, 27 percent unemployment, 25 percent corruption, followed by poor economy, education, suicide attacks and poverty. When asked: “What is the biggest problem in your local area?” unemployment and electricity dominated with 29 percent selecting unemployment, 25 percent electricity, 20 percent roads, 18 percent drinking water, and only 10 percent insecurity/violence. These ratings are consistent with similar surveys conducted between 2006 and 2012. Furthermore, when asked to rate the performance of the Afghan government, the majority felt it was doing a bad job with creating jobs (68 percent), fighting corruption (68 percent), and economic development (54 percent), whereas a majority thought it was doing a good job with security (70 percent favourable). Overall, 75 percent felt the national government was doing a “good” or “somewhat good” job in fulfilling its responsibilities. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People, pp. 29, 30, 82–6.
124. See, for example, Carlotta Gall, “Karzai Pressed to Move on Taliban Reintegration,” New York Times (25 June 2010).
125. Thomas K. McCraw, Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and Countries Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1998).
126. Our approach here has been critically informed by the work of the McKinsey Global Institute. See, for instance, McKinsey Global Institute, How to Compete and Grow after the Recover: A Sector Approach (September 2009); How to Compete and Grow: A Sector Guide to Policy (March 2010).
127. Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Organisation (CSO) lists in its 2011–2012 statistical appendix that its most recent data indicate 55% of households and 59% of the population work in the agriculture sector, and that it contributes 26.74% to GDP. “Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, 2011–2012: Agriculture Development”, available at http://cso.gov.af/en/page/7108.
128. A McKinsey analysis of 25 developing economies (<$5000 per capita GDP) for which there is comparable GDP data between 1985 and 2005 revealed that agriculture was, overall, the most important sector contributor to GDP growth, and a top-three driver of growth in 17 of the 25 economies.
129. McKinsey Global Institute, How to Compete and Grow after the Recover, p. 10.
130. The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, p. 25.
131. Center for International Private Enterprise and Chaney Research, “Afghan Business Attitudes on the Economy, Government, and Business Organisations – 2009– 2010 Afghan Business Survey, Final Report” (May 2010), available at www.cipe.org/ regional/southasia/pdf/Afghan%20Business%20Survey%20Report_5–04–10_FINAL. pdf.
132. Alissa J. Rubin and Adam B. Ellick, “More Trouble Ahead for Kabul Bank”, New York Times (14 September 2010). Afghanistan ranks 154th of 185 countries in access to credit according to World Bank, Ease of Doing Business: Afghanistan 2013.
133. See, for example, OTF Group, “Three Cluster Discussion Document” for Commercial Competition Commission of Afghanistan (14 September 2005).
134. McKinsey Global Institute, How to Compete and Grow: A Sector Guide to Policy (March 2010).
135. See James R. Yeager, “The Aynak Copper Tender: Implications for Afghanistan and the West” (2009).
136. Interviews with USAID contractors in Afghanistan. On this broader theme, see Andrew Natsios, “The Clash of the Counter-Bureaucracy and Development”, Center for Global Development Essay (July 2010).
137. On this general point, see Berdal and Mousavizadeh, “Investing in Peace: The Private Sector and the Challenges of Peacebuilding”.
138. The authors wish to thank the Aspen Institute for permission to adapt an earlier chapter that was originally published in American Interests in South Asia: Building a Grand Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (Aspen Institute, 2011), edited by Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price. The authors also wish to thank Sayce Falk, a consultant in McKinsey & Company’s Washington, DC office, for his research assistance.